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Abstract
Objectives The paper explores the effects of electronic monitoring (EM) on young
offenders’ educational outcomes and contributes to the evaluation of EM as a non-cus-
todial sanction with a new outcome measure.
Methods The study is based on a natural experiment exploiting a reform in Denmark in
2006 introducing electronic monitoring to all offenders under the age of 25 with a max-
imum prison sentence of 3 months. Information on program participation is used to esti-
mate instrument variable models in order to assess the causal effects of EM on young
offenders’ educational outcomes. The empirical analyses are based on a comprehensive
longitudinal dataset (n = 1013) constructed from multiple official administrative registers
and including a high number of covariates.
Results The EM-program increases the completion rates of upper secondary education
by 18 % points among program participants 3 years post-release. The EM-program
includes house arrest under electronic surveillance, labor market or education participation,
unannounced drug and alcohol tests and a crime preventive program. It is not possible to
separate the treatment effects of the different program elements in the empirical analyses.
Keywords Natural experiment  Instrumental variable model  Electronic monitoring 
Education  Non-custodial sanction
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Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the use of electronic monitoring (EM) for offenders has spread to
penal systems across the world (Nellis et al. 2013). More than 500,000 people in the United
States and Europe had been electronically monitored by 2010 (Di Tella and Schargrodsky
2013), and nearly 200,000 EM units are used in the United States each year (Payne, 2014).
In times with growing prison populations, EM has been introduced in many Western
countries as a substitute for imprisonment or as part of an early release program in order to
reduce expenditures in the prison system (Renzema and Mayo-Wilson 2005). Although
EM has been implemented in many different legal systems over the last three decades,
there is still a lack of empirical knowledge on the effects of this non-custodial alternative to
imprisonment (Andersen and Andersen 2014).
Non-custodial sanctions such as probation, community service and electronic moni-
toring typically lack random assignment, because offenders with the most serious records
and the highest risk of re-offending are often found non-eligible and placed in confinement.
This makes it difficult to determine the causal effects of these types of sanctions, as
selection into the programs often depends on the expected outcome (for example, re-
offending). Previous reviews of non-custodial sanctions and electronic monitoring have
only identified a few quantitative studies that applied methodologically sound designs in
order to evaluate the effects of alternative sanctions (Renzema and Mayo-Wilson 2005;
Villettaz et al. 2006). The evaluations of EM-programs included in these reviews did not
find significant effects of electronic monitoring on recidivism rates (e.g. Bonta et al. 2000;
Finn and Muirhead-Steves 2002). However, these small-scale evaluations have since been
criticized for methodological shortcomings (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013; Marklund
and Holmberg 2009), and recent studies of EM have identified positive effects on par-
ticipants’ subsequent criminal outcomes. Marklund and Holmberg (2009) evaluate the
Swedish EM-program using matching methods and document lower recidivism rates
among offenders with early release on electronic monitoring. More recent studies have
done causal inference by applying different natural experimental designs to address
selection bias. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) use the random assignment of judges in
Argentina to compare offenders serving in prison with offenders serving with electronic
monitoring, and they document significant negative effects on re-arrest rates between 11
and 16 % points. A study of early EM releases from prisons in England using a regression
discontinuity design finds a reduction in the probability of re-arrest of ex-prisoners between
20 and 40 % within 2 years (Marie 2015). Finally, two studies exploit the reforms that
introduced and extended the use of electronic monitoring in Denmark and document
negative effects on recidivism (Jørgensen 2011) and positive effects on subsequent labor
market outcomes (Andersen and Andersen 2014).
This brief survey of recent studies on electronic monitoring reflects a general trend in
the literature evaluating non-custodial sanctions. The literature typically has a strong focus
on recidivism, which leaves a gap when it comes to measures of rehabilitation (Killias
et al. 2010). Although a classic argument for substituting short-term prison sentences with
non-custodial sanctions is the damaging effects of imprisonment on offenders’ social
networks and integration into society, rehabilitation outcomes such as employment,
income, education and family relations are rarely measured and evaluated (Villettaz et al.,
2006). Furthermore, little is known about the effects of alternative sanctions on young
offenders’ future outcomes. Studies of juvenile court involvement and incarceration have
documented substantial negative effects on educational attainments (Aizer and Doyle
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2015; Hjalmarsson 2008; Sweeten 2006). Therefore, it is important to obtain knowledge
about whether non-custodial sanctions like EM interrupt young adults’ educational course
to a lesser extent. The grounds for changing the Danish legislation in 2006 and giving
young offenders with short-term prison sentences the opportunity to serve with electronic
monitoring was actually the argument of maintaining labor market participation and
educational enrollment (Sorensen and Kyvsgaard 2009). The scope of this paper is to
contribute with new knowledge about non-custodial sanctions by comparing the effects of
imprisonment and electronic monitoring on young offenders’ educational outcomes.
Electronic monitoring is a less intrusive type of punishment compared to custodial
sanctions,1 and criminological theoretical perspectives provide diverse expectations
regarding the impact on offenders’ future outcomes. The theories on deterrence argue that
the severity of punishment affects the offenders’ subsequent criminal behavior, because the
experience of imprisonment changes the offenders’ perception of sanctions (e.g., Becker
1968; see reviews of deterrence studies: Nagin 1998, 2013; Nagin et al. 2009). Hence, the
deterrence perspective would predict higher reoffending rates among offenders serving
with EM, compared to offenders serving time in prison. A less severe punishment would
have a lower self-deterrent effect, and offenders who experience incarceration would be
more likely to desist from criminal acts.2 Offenders serving with EM would therefore have
a higher probability of reoffending, and thus be more likely to drop out of education and
achieve lower educational outcomes due to subsequent imprisonment. On the other hand,
theories on social learning and peer effects point to lower re-offending rates among
offenders serving with EM with reference to the interactions with other criminals, the
training of criminogenic skills and the hardening of offenders in prison. Within this
framework, exposure to deviant peers is assumed to prompt higher levels of delinquency
due to deviant attitudes and norms, direct modeling and indirect reinforcing effects (see
e.g., Akers 1998; Mcgloin 2009). Empirical studies have documented causal peer effects
and specialization among inmates (e.g. Bayer et al. 2009; Damm and Gorinas 2013;
Stevenson 2014), which suggests that offenders in house arrest with electronic surveillance
who have fewer interactions with other criminals and more contact with pro-social peers
(like family) would be less likely to reoffend. In regards to educational outcomes, this
would imply that offenders serving with EM with lower recidivism rates are less likely to
drop out and have a higher chance of achieving better educational results. Additionally, in
EM-programs including a provision to attend school, contact with pro-social classmates,
instead of criminal inmates, can increase the chances of young offenders continuing in the
school system.
1 It is important to mention that empirical studies have questioned this notion of non-custodial sanctions as
less harsh or severe to the individual, e.g., through examples of offenders choosing prison instead of early
release with intense supervision and through offenders rating non-custodial sanctions as more severe than
short-term prison sentences (Descenes et al. 1995; Payne and Gainey 1998; Petersilia and Descenes 1994;
Wood and May 2003). In the Danish context, however, about 80 percent of the offenders rated electronic
monitoring as less severe than prison, when asked in a questionnaire after the EM-program (Jørgensen
2011).
2 Previous reviews on imprisonment and reoffending document, that the empirical evidence of deterrent
effects of imprisonment is non-conclusive (Mears et al. 2015; Nagin et al. 2009). This picture is also
reflected in recent studies addressing selection issues and yet identifying diverse results: Bales and Piquero
(2012) and Cochran et al. (2014) find higher risk of recidivism among imprisoned offenders compared to
offenders e.g., on probation, whereas Kuziemko (2013) shows that the length of imprisonment lowers the
risk of recidivism, and Nagin and Snodgrass (2013) find little evidence that incarceration has an impact on
rearrests.
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The purpose of the present study is to examine the effects of electronic monitoring by
looking at a new outcome measure, education, which has great significance to the young
offenders’ future trajectories. Previous research has documented a negative correlation
between education and delinquency (e.g., Farrington et al. 1986; Gottfredson 1985;
Lochner and Moretti 2004), as individuals with higher educational attainments are less
likely to be involved in criminal activities. Furthermore, a large number of empirical
studies have documented negative effects of dropping out of secondary education on
subsequent criminal outcomes (see review in Rumberger 2011). Education is not only
important to criminal outcomes, but plays a significant role in determining individual life-
course outcomes, such as health, income and employment (see e.g., reviews by Card 1999;
Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011). Thus, the completion of upper secondary education is
important to all young adults to secure future life outcomes, and especially to young
offenders in order to reduce the risk of reoffending, overcome the mark of a criminal
record, enhance the chance of entering the labor market and obtain a legitimate income.
Research Design and Methodology
In Denmark, serving with electronic monitoring has gradually been introduced as a non-
custodial sanction over the last decade from 2005 to 2013.3 Contrary to many other
countries, electronic monitoring in Denmark is a voluntary program offered by the
Department of Prison and Probation Service (DPPS) as a way of serving a prison sentence.
This implies that the Danish program is an alternative to imprisonment and not part of the
probation program or other early release programs. Thus, offenders who meet the formal
criteria regarding sentence length (and age), who are not incarcerated and do not have
unserved prison sentences receive a letter informing them about the opportunity to serve
the prison sentence at home under intensive surveillance and control.
Offenders who choose to apply for the EM-program must fulfill a number of require-
ments in order to get approved for the program by the DPPS. First of all, they have to hold
a permanent address and obtain consent from family members, spouse or other individuals
over the age of 18 living at the address. Second, they must participate in the labor market
or be enrolled in an educational program. Third, offenders who have previously served
with EM are disqualified if re-sentenced (incl. suspended sentences) within the last 2 years.
Finally, the DPPS can reject the application to the EM-program with reference to personal
circumstances (e.g., intensive drug or alcohol abuse). Prior studies of the Danish EM-
program have shown that among young offenders offered the chance to serve with elec-
tronic monitoring, 30 % did not apply to the program, and 9 % had their applications
rejected by the DPPS (Jørgensen 2011).4
The Danish EM-program includes house arrest under electronic surveillance with an
ankle bracelet and a fixed schedule for leaving and returning to the house within a time
3 The Danish EM-program was first introduced to traffic offenders with a maximum sentence of three
months in May 2005, then extended in April 2006 to all offenders between the ages of 15 and 25 with a
maximum prison sentence of three months and extended in June 2008 to all offenders with a maximum
prison sentence of three months (no age requirements). In 2010, the requirement of the maximum prison
sentence was raised from three to five months, and finally, in July 2013, to a maximum of six months
(Jørgensen 2011; Sorensen and Kyvsgaard 2009).
4 These numbers are based on records of young offenders between the ages of 15 and 25 offered to serve
with EM within the first year after the reform. This type of information was, however, not available for this
study.
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limit of plus/minus 5 min. The program participants are obliged to attend work or school
(minimum of 20 h a week), and they are subject to unannounced visits from DPPS
workers, including tests for drug or alcohol use. Finally, they attend a mandatory crime
preventive program organized by DPPS. If the offenders violate any of these terms, the
permit to serve under house arrest will be suspended, and he/she will serve the rest of the
sentence in prison.
A methodological note should be made in regard to the program content; due to the fact
that the Danish EM-program includes several elements besides electronic surveillance, it is
not possible to distinguish between the effects of electronic monitoring and other parts of
the program in the empirical analyses. The program conditions and content are of great
importance when comparing custodial and non-custodial sanctions, because they define the
fundamental characteristics of the comparison, and thus the generalizability of the findings
(Mears et al. 2015; Nagin et al. 2009). I compare participants in the EM-program who are
treated with all of the different program elements (described above) to offenders serving
their sentence in prison. In a Danish context, a custodial sanction of a maximum of
3 months sentenced to offenders over the age of 18 typically entails confinement in an
open prison facility.5 In the open prisons, the prisoners can leave the facility during the day
to attend school or work. The assignment of offenders to facilities by the DPPS relies on
sentence length, age, distance to residential address (i.e. to maintain enrollment in edu-
cation) and prison capacity (Damm and Gorinas 2013). Although offenders serving in open
prisons officially have the opportunity to continue their educational program during their
imprisonment, this can be difficult to do in practice. Prison facilities are, for example, often
located in the countryside, and the distance to the educational institutions by public
transportation can therefore be very long.
The Natural Experiment
Evaluating the causal effects of serving a sentence with electronic monitoring requires a
treatment group and a control group that are identical in all characteristics besides the type
of sanction. This requirement makes it difficult to determine the causal effects of new
forms of sanctions such as probation, community service or electronic monitoring, as they
are often introduced without a controlled trial setup. Alternative sanctions typically lack
random assignment, as offenders with the most serious records are found non-eligible to
serve with e.g., electronic monitoring, and are thus placed in confinement. These cir-
cumstances cause selection problems, and together with the fact that the EM-programs are
often restricted to low-risk offenders, this makes it difficult to evaluate the program effects
(Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013).
In this study, I exploit a natural experiment and apply instrumental variable estimations
to address these methodological challenges and evaluate the causal effects of EM on ex-
offenders’ educational outcomes. Specifically, I analyze the Danish reform of 2006
introducing EM to offenders between the ages of 15 and 25 with a maximum prison
sentence of 3 months, and evaluate a case with an EM-program offered to young moderate
5 In Denmark, serving in a closed prison facility with high levels of security and monitoring, where
prisoners only receive permission to leave the facility on special occasions, are restricted to offenders with
either a prison sentence above five years, a gang membership, a high protection need or a high risk of
evasion (Damm and Gorinas 2013).
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risk offenders with short custodial sentences who would otherwise be incarcerated.6 The
EM-reform constitutes a natural experiment in which young offenders with short-term
prison sentences are ‘treated’ with different types of sanctions before and after the reform.7
The setup makes it possible to compare educational outcomes between the treatment
group: offenders sentenced April 21st 2006 to April 21st 2009 and the historical control
group: offenders sentenced April 21st 2003 to April 20th 2006. The overall design of the
study is illustrated in Fig. 1.
When applying a natural experimental design and including a historical control group, it
is important to consider any historical changes that can affect the comparability between
the two groups. In regards to the justice system, changes in the penal code or the judges
sentencing practice that entail short prison sentences in new types of cases could poten-
tially bias the results if the characteristics of the offenders with a prison term under
3 months systematically changed over the period 2003–2009. The introduction of new
alternative sanctions restricted to convictions of a certain length could affect the judges’
sentencing behavior. However, this does not appear to be the case in Denmark in relation to
the EM-program, since the overall distribution in sentence length did not change around
the EM-reform (Andersen and Andersen 2014), and there are no substantial differences in
types of crimes or sentence lengths between the two groups of offenders convicted before
and after the reform (see Table 1). Hence, there is no evidence of the introduction of the
EM-program as an offer to young offenders leading to systematic changes in the judges’
sentencing behavior, either towards lower or higher prison terms, in the years 2006–2009.
This suggests that the reform, which introduces a new form of non-custodial sanctions and
changes the individuals’ likelihood of serving with EM from 1 day to the next, is unrelated
to the characteristics of the offenders.
At the same time, it is important to look at reforms and other changes in the educational
system that could affect the dropout and completion rates of the control and treatment
groups differently during the observed period (2003–2009). If there was a time trend, for
example, a general gradient decrease in the dropout rate over the 6 year period, then the
estimated treatment effects could be biased. The present study focuses on upper secondary
education, which is divided into two main tracks in Denmark: vocational education and
training and general upper secondary education.8 The official statistics show stable com-
pletion rates in Denmark from 2003 to 2009 in both vocational and general upper sec-
ondary education. To investigate whether this general trend also applies to the study
sample, I compare the educational outcomes of the control and treatment groups prior to
conviction. Figure 2 shows the percentage of young offenders who are not enrolled in and
have not completed upper secondary education at five different time points prior to con-
viction and five different time points after release from prison or the EM-program. Two
years before conviction, about 40 % of the offenders are not enrolled in and have not
completed upper secondary education. This percentage falls gradually up until conviction,
when the restrictions of the study sample imply that all offenders are enrolled in upper
6 In Denmark, short-term prison sentences are widely used; 61 percent of a total of 9,967 prison sentences in
2013 were below 4 months (Department of Prison and Probation Service, 2013).
7 A similar identification strategy was used by Andersen and Andersen (2014) in their study of labor market
outcomes, and this study contributes by analyzing educational outcomes.
8 In the Danish educational system, primary and lower secondary schooling levels are integrated into a
compulsory nine-year program (followed by an optional 10th year). The compulsory level is followed by the
upper secondary level, with the general programs lasting 2–3 years and qualifying students for higher
education and the vocational programs lasting 3.5 years on average and qualifying students to enter skilled
employment in the labor market.
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secondary education at the time of conviction (cf. sample description in ‘‘Data’’ section).
There are no significant differences between the treatment and control groups prior to
conviction, which suggests that the outcome measure is not influenced by historical
changes.
Data
The empirical analyses use a longitudinal dataset constructed from multiple administrative
registers provided by Statistics Denmark and matched by a unique personal identifier. This
dataset enables me to draw a full sample of all 8741 Danish offenders 15–25 years old who
are sentenced to a prison sentence of a maximum of 3 months from April 21st 2006 to
April 21st 2009. In the Danish legal system, special sentencing and sanctioning options
apply to offenders between the ages of 15 and 18, which implies that they are not placed in
regular prison with adult inmates, but confined at special secured institutions.9 For this
reason, I restrict the analyses to offenders 18–25 years old, given that the sample of young
offenders below the age of 18 (n = 413) is too small to estimate separate models for this
group. Furthermore, to ensure that the comparison of sanction types is limited to electronic
monitoring versus imprisonment, I exclude offenders who are ‘fuzzy’ treated (n = 264), as
they are sentenced to both imprisonment and community service.
I use data from the DPPS to identify offenders in the treatment group who fulfill the
formal criteria and are offered to serve with electronic monitoring by letter from the DPPS.
To match this group of offenders, I use the detailed register data to extract a historical
control group conditioned on the same formal criteria that apply to the treatment group.
These restrictions of the two groups reduce the sample to a total of 5230 individuals who
fulfill the formal criteria to serve with EM. In a final step, I reduce the dataset to the 1013
offenders who are enrolled in education at the time of conviction. This step is important in
order to ensure that the educational outcome is not influenced by the offenders’ antici-
pation of treatment, because the approval by the DDPS to serve with EM requires par-
ticipation in the labor market or educational enrollment. The enrollment in upper
secondary education is measured at the day of conviction, as this time point also defines
whether the offender is eligible for the EM-program or not (i.e. convicted before or after
the reform).
Fig. 1 Design of the study based on the EM-reform in Denmark in April 2006
9 In Denmark, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 15 and young offenders are sentenced by the
same penal code and in the same courts as adult offenders, as there is no separate juvenile justice system. A
number of special sentencing and sanctioning options exist for young offenders (15–18 years old), and when
placed in custody or sentenced to a prison term, they are confined in separate institutions (Kyvsgaard 2003).
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In order to analyze the educational outcomes, I exploit the longitudinal register data and
follow the offenders for 3 years after their release from prison or the EM-program. At the
time of the study, this is the maximum follow-up period for which educational records are
Table 1 Descriptive characteristics of control and treatment groups
Control group Treatment group Difference
Demography
Male offender 0.98 0.98 0.00
Female offender 0.02 0.02 0.00
Native Dane and western immigrant 0.83 0.81 0.03
Non-western immigrant 0.17 0.19 -0.03
Living at home Jan. 1st year of conviction 0.53 0.56 -0.03
Conviction
Mean age at conviction 20.70 20.54 0.16
Convicted for violence or sexual offense 0.68 0.71 -0.03
Convicted for property crime 0.19 0.12 0.08***
Convicted for traffic offense 0.02 0.05 -0.02*
Convicted for drug or weapon related offense 0.04 0.04 0.00
Other criminal offenses 0.06 0.09 -0.03
Mean sentence length 43.81 46.18 -2.37
Criminal history
Mean age at first conviction 17.90 17.63 0.27*
No prior convictions 0.19 0.12 0.07**
Mean number of previous convictions 3.73 3.62 0.11
No prior prison convictions 0.82 0.76 0.06*
Primary school (highest)
Finished 8th grade 0.06 0.07 -0.02
Finished 9th grade 0.43 0.48 -0.05
Finished 10th grade 0.47 0.40 0.08*
No record finished primary school 0.04 0.05 -0.01
Education at time of conviction
Enrolled in upp. sec. educ. at conviction 1.00 1.00 0.00
General education (1st–3rd year) 0.09 0.09 0.00
Vocational education (1st year) 0.44 0.39 0.05
Vocational education (2nd year) 0.13 0.13 0.00
Vocational education (3rd year) 0.14 0.20 -0.06*
Vocational education (4th year) 0.21 0.20 0.01
Mean months, upp. sec. edu. at conviction 21.40 21.33 0.07
Mean months, upp. sec. edu. at release 25.42 25.22 0.20
Number of obs. 570 443
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001 for t-test of difference (rounded digits in the table) between control
and treatment groups
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available for all six cohorts of offenders convicted 2003–2009.10 The register data holds
information on all entries in the Danish educational system, and I measure the outcome
variable (enrolled, dropped out, completed) at six different time points: 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30
and 36 months after release. The outcome variable is measured relative to the offender’s
unique release date, and it allows for re-entry to the educational system between the six
different time points. The descriptive analyses in the section ‘‘Empirical Findings’’ report
all three outcome categories: enrolled, dropped out and completed upper secondary edu-
cation, and they also include a survival analysis of the time to completion. The regression
analyses solely focus on completed upper secondary education as the outcome measure,
given that the initial results do not reveal significant differences in the enrollment rates of
the treatment and control groups. Completion of upper secondary education is especially
important to the group of young offenders in this study, as 91 % of them are enrolled in the
vocational program, which qualifies them to enter skilled employment in the labor market
(such as e.g., carpenter, blacksmith, electrician or hairdresser) directly after graduating.
Fig. 2 Percentage of young offenders with short-term prison sentences who are not enrolled in and have not
completed upper secondary education at five time points prior to conviction and five time points after
release. Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison
and Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced to short-term prison sentences in
2003–2009
10 Attrition in the Danish register data only occurs upon death or migration, and this entails that only two
offenders are excluded because of missing educational information during the three year follow-up period.
However, the case handling was prolonged and postponed the release date of 16 offenders in the treatment
group. This implies that I cannot follow their educational attainments for the full 36 months. Instead of
excluding these cases from the analyses (and potentially introducing selection), I have included their last
educational record measured at 28–35 months. Any implications for the estimation of the treatment effect
would most likely bias the EM-program coefficient downwards, as the 16 offenders in the treatment group
have a shorter time period to finish the educational program.
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The use of register data makes it possible to test the comparability of the historical
control group and the treatment group with a high number of observables. Thus, I combine
multiple administrative registers to include a wide range of different control variables on
demography, type of sentence, crime and educational history. The first three types of
variables are included with reference to prior research that enhanced the importance of
including information on conviction offense type, criminal history and demography (age,
sex and race) in studies comparing different forms of sanctions (Nagin et al. 2009). In
addition to these classical covariates in criminological studies, I also include information
on the offenders’ prior educational attainment to ensure that the treatment and control
groups do not differ substantially pre-treatment in observables linked to the outcome
measure. Table 1 shows summary statistics for these variables, including test of the mean
tendencies between the treatment and the control groups. The descriptive statistics for the
two groups only reveal small differences in the type of offense, crime and educational
history between the treatment and the control groups.11
Estimation Method
The study samples consist of a total of 1013 offenders sentenced to a prison term of a
maximum of 3 months who fulfill the formal requirements to serve with electronic mon-
itoring. The control group includes 570 offenders convicted in 2003–2006 (prior to the
reform) who all served their sentences in prison. As described previously, electronic
monitoring is a voluntary program in Denmark, and participation in the program requires
the offender to apply and obtain approval from the DPPS. This program feature implies
that the treatment group includes 278 individuals who applied for the EM-program, got
approved by the DPPS and served their sentence with EM and 165 offenders who did not
apply for the program or did not receive permission to serve with EM, and therefore,
served the sentence in prison (see Table 2).
This empirical setup with a ‘divided’ treatment group resembles a classic example of
non-compliance to treatment in an experimental study, where the intended treatment is
randomly assigned, but the delivered treatment is not randomly distributed, because some
of the participants in the treatment group do not comply with the assigned treatment. In this
study, I argue that the intended treatment, offering offenders the EM-program, is randomly
assigned due to the reform in 2006 (as discussed in ‘‘The Natural Experiment’’ section),
whereas the delivered treatment, serving with EM, is not randomly assigned. Quite the
contrary, the delivered treatment relies on the offenders’ application to the EM-program
and the permission of the DPPS, and is, therefore, expected to be determined by (unob-
servable) characteristics of the offender, such as drug abuse, motivation and social net-
work. Put in other terms, the offenders who end up serving under house arrest with
electronic monitoring are selected members of the treatment group and are most likely to
be offenders with the lowest risk of recidivism and the highest chances of completing their
education, even if they were not in the EM-program. These selection issues, which are
caused by the offenders’ self-selection into the program, and the non-random allocation of
permissions by the DPPS, underline the importance of applying appropriate estimation
techniques to address selection and omitted variable bias. This is important, as the
11 In relation to criminal and educational history, the descriptive results could point to a small negative
selection into the treatment group, as they have ‘worse’ records than the control group. If these differences
between the two groups influence the results, it would most likely imply an underestimation of the effects of
the EM-program.
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fundamental assumption of exogeneity in the linear regression model is violated when the
unobserved characteristics of the offenders (such as motivation, self-control or drug abuse)
are correlated with both the likelihood of serving with EM (X) and educational outcomes
(Y). This means that if we estimate the treatment effects with simple OLS-regression
models, the regression estimates would be biased by confounding, and causal interpretation
is not possible (Angrist 2006).
One strategy to address the methodological issues is to estimate Intention-To-Treat
(ITT) models. Here, the researcher compares outcomes between the control group and the
group assigned to treatment; in this case, all 443 individuals in the treatment group who
were offered to serve with EM (regardless of whether they actually served with EM or in
prison). This way, you make a ‘conservative’ evaluation of the treatment effects as you
compare the outcomes of the non-treated control group to the outcomes of a mixed group
of treated and non-treated offenders. Hence, the ITT-models will, by definition, underes-
timate the effects of treatment due to the non-compliance (Angrist 2006; Bushway and
Apel 2010).
A second strategy is to estimate an Instrument Variable (IV)-model that addresses the
selection issues and takes the compliance rate into account. The IV-strategy allows you to
exploit the random assignment of the intended treatment to estimate the causal effects of
the delivered treatment (Angrist 2006).12 In this setup, I use the EM-reform in Denmark in
2006 as an instrument (Z) for whether the offender served with electronic monitoring or
served in prison. The EM-reform is highly correlated with the endogenous variable
(serving with EM), but unrelated to the enrollment/completion rates from upper secondary
education (see ‘‘The Natural Experiment’’ section). I estimate two stage least square
(2SLS) regression models to evaluate the causal effects of electronic monitoring on the
offenders’ subsequent educational outcome, using the reform, which introduces random
allocation to the EM-program (intended treatment) as an instrument of serving with EM
(delivered treatment). The 2SLS regression model can be written as follows:
First stage: Xi ¼ a0 þ a1Zi þ xi ð1Þ
Second stage: Yi ¼ b0 þ b1X̂i þ ei ð2Þ
ITT-model (reduced form): Yi ¼ d0 þ d1Zi þ li ð3Þ
where Xi is the delivered treatment variable, served with EM or not for individual i., Zi is
the instrument variable, convicted before or after the reform for individual i, Yi is the
12 The IV-strategy has been a standard technique used in economics for decades, but the application of IV-
models in criminology has been limited (Angrist 2006; Bushway and Apel 2010). For examples of crimi-
nological studies using the IV-technique, cf. Apel et al. (2008) or Kilmer (2008).
Table 2 Control and treatment group by sanction type
Control group Treatment group (offered EM)
Served in prison 570 165a
Served under house arrest with EM 0 278
Total 570 443
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
a 29 offenders broke the terms to serve with EM and served the rest of the sentence in prison
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educational outcome for individual i, xi, ei and li are the error terms in the respective
models.
The first stage model estimates the correlation between the instrument (Z) and the
endogenous variable (X), and the fitted values from the first-stage model (X̂i) are used in
the second-stage model as an instrument put in the place of the endogenous variable. In a
model with a dummy variable of the delivered treatment (1 for serving with EM and 0 for
serving in prison), the first stage model measures the compliance rate, in this case, the
proportion of the population that serves with electronic monitoring. The second stage
model estimates the 2SLS coefficient, and in models with one-sided non-compliance,13 this
estimate can be interpreted as the average causal effect of treatment to the treated (ATET)
(Angrist, 2006). In this study, the ATET-effect applies to young offenders (18–25 years
old) with short-term prison sentences who are enrolled in education at the time of con-
viction and who are in the EM-program, and it reflects the difference between the average
educational outcomes of the offenders serving with EM and the average educational
outcomes of the imprisoned offenders. The 2SLS estimate is a rescaling of the ITT-effect
by the compliance rate, when the IV-model includes one endogenous variable and a single
instrument (Angrist 2006). All in all, the IV-method is a simple and valuable technique to
address selection bias in both experimental and quasi-experimental studies (Angrist 2006;
Bushway and Apel 2010).
It is important to note that I estimate linear regression models (and not probit or logit
models), even though the outcome measure and instrument variable are discrete. The linear
regression estimates are identical to marginal effects in non-linear models when applied to
a saturated regression model, only including dummy variables on the right hand side
(Angrist 2006; Angrist and Pischke 2009). Furthermore, the causal interpretation of the
2SLS estimates is not affected by the nonlinearity of the discrete instrument variable or the
outcome measure (Angrist 2001, 2006). The 2SLS regression model is therefore preferable
to other more complex estimation methods, such as 3SLS models.
Empirical Findings
In order to evaluate educational outcomes after serving with electronic monitoring, I look
at six different time points after the offenders’ release from either prison or the EM-
program. There are no significant differences between the treatment and control groups at
3, 6, or 12 months after release (see Table 3). But, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months after release,
the percentage of offenders who completed upper secondary education is significantly
higher in the treatment group. In both the treatment and the control group, about 20 % of
the offenders dropped out of the educational system from the time of conviction, during the
time served and within the first 3 months post-release. This suggests that the results found
by Aizer and Doyle (2015) in their study of juvenile incarcerations do not apply to a
Danish case with young offenders enrolled in upper secondary education. Aizer and Doyle
(2015) document negative effects of short periods of incarceration on the likelihood of
returning to school among juveniles, which are potentially caused by formal hindrances in
the school system. However, in this study, there are no significant differences between the
13 In experimental settings, the non-compliance can be two-sided in cases with both treatment migration
(when individuals in the control group are treated) and treatment dilution (when individuals in the treatment
group do not receive treatment). This study of a natural experiment, with a legal reform introducing
treatment at a specific date, is only subject to one-sided non-compliance due to treatment dilution.
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offenders serving in prison and the offenders serving with EM within the first 12 months
after release. So, if discrimination also exists in the Danish educational system, it seems to
affect both groups of offenders in this study.
Figure 3 shows the time to completion of upper secondary education, measured in days
from the time of conviction. To ensure that differences between offenders serving in prison
and offenders serving with EM do not simply reflect a delay in the completion time caused
by the confinement period, the number of days spent in prison is excluded from the
exposure time in the survival plot. The results support the previous findings, as there are no
differences in the probability of completing upper secondary education in the first years
after conviction, and the treatment group has significantly higher completion rates com-
pared to the control group in the longer run.
The descriptive results show similar educational outcomes for the young ex-offenders
with short prison sentences within the first year after conviction/release and higher edu-
cational outcomes for the treatment group in the longer run. However, these simple
comparisons of educational outcomes between the treatment and control groups could
underestimate the actual effects of the EM-program compared to imprisonment. About
37 % of the offenders in the treatment group were offered the chance to participate in the
EM-program, but served in prison (see Table 2). Hence, the comparisons do not reflect the
‘real’ differences between offenders serving with EM and offenders serving in prison, but
can be characterized as descriptive intent-to-treat estimates. In the next section, I present
the results from the IV-regression models that estimate the causal effects of the EM
program, taking both the selection of participants for the EM-program and the compliance
rate in the treatment group into account.
Results from IV-Estimations
The IV-method estimates two regression models simultaneously: the first and second stage
regression models. Table 4 shows the results of two first stage models with and without
covariates. The first stage regression models evaluate the effects of the intended treatment,
offered to serve with EM (convicted after the reform) on the delivered treatment, served
with EM. The results show large and significant first stage effects of the instrument. The
introduction of covariates does not influence the results, which suggests that the second
stage estimations (presented in Table 5, Models C) can be interpreted as the average causal
Table 3 Educational outcome for control and treatment groups post-release (%)
Upper secondary education Control group (n = 570) Treatment group (n = 443)
Enrolled Completed Dropped out Enrolled Completed Dropped out
3 months after release 61 16 23 64 15 21
6 months after release 55 18 27 56 20 24
1 year after release 42 25 33 43 28 29
1.5 years after release 35 30 35 33 37* 30
2 years after release 27 35 38 24 44** 32*
2.5 years after release 22 40 38 19 49** 32*
3 years after release 18 42 40 15 53*** 32*
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001 for t-test of difference between control and treatment groups
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effect of serving with electronic monitoring, because individual offender characteristics do
not appear to influence the likelihood of the offender being convicted before or after the
EM-reform. Furthermore, only a few of the observed individual characteristics (demog-
raphy, criminal history and prior educational records) contribute significantly to explain
which offenders eventually serve with EM (see all results for the covariates in the first
stage model in Table 6 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
Table 5 shows the results from three different types of regression models for the
completion of upper secondary education, measured 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30 and 36 months
after release. Models A are simple OLS regression models, Models B are Intent-To-Treat
regression models and Models C are the second stage regression models. The 2SLS
regressions (Models C) show the average differences in the completion rates of upper
secondary education between offenders serving with EM and offenders serving the sen-
tence in prison. There are no significant differences 3, 6 and 12 months after release, which
points to a short-term retention effect among offenders from the EM-program, leading to
higher completion rates in the longer run. After 18 months, 2SLS estimates show signif-
icant differences between the two groups, and the EM-program increases the completion
rates from upper secondary education by 11.2 % points 1.5 years after release and 17.8 %
points 3 years after release. Thus, there is a positive effect of the EM-program on the
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Fig. 3 Survival plot: time to
completion of upper secondary
education from conviction. Data
source: Administrative register
data from Statistics Denmark and
the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish
offenders (age 18–25) sentenced
short-term prison sentences in
2003–2009. Note: Wilcoxon
Test, p value: 0.003 and Log-
Rank Test, p value 0.001
Table 4 First stage regression models, dep. var.: served with EM (treatment delivered)
No covariates With covariates
Convicted after the EM-Reform in
2006 (intended/offered treatment)
0.628***
(0.023)
0.633***
(0.023)
Observations 1013 1013
R2 (adjusted) 0.486 0.505
F test for instrument 744.9 762.4
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
Robust standard errors in parentheses and * p\ 0.05, ** p\ 0.01, *** p\ 0.001
Covariates: gender, ethnicity, living at home, age at conviction, type of offense, sentence length, number of
prior convictions, prior prison convictions, primary schooling and upper secondary education at conviction
(type and years enrolled)
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educational outcome of young offenders with short custodial sanctions, as a higher per-
centage of the offenders serving with electronic monitoring complete upper secondary
education post-release.
Table 5 also includes the results of simple OLS-models and ITT-models for compari-
son. First, the simple OLS regressions (Model A) identify significant differences at 4–6
time spells and overestimate the effects of the EM-program, when compared to the results
from the 2SLS-models. Second, the ITT-models take selection into account by comparing
the control group with the total treatment group (offered to serve with EM). The results
resemble the 2SLS-estimations by identifying a significant difference 1.5, 2, 2.5 and
3 years after release. But the ITT-estimates are too low, relative to the 2SLS-estimates,
because only 63 % of the offenders in the treatment group served with EM, and this drives
the estimated effects downwards. The 2SLS-estimates are a rescaling of the ITT-effects by
the compliance rate, and they identify the causal program effects of electronic monitoring,
which otherwise would have been underestimated by applying ITT-estimation techniques.
Sensitivity Analyses
The robustness of the results from the empirical analyses is tested with different specifi-
cations of the study sample. First, the result from the first stage model with covariates
suggests that matching the group of offenders serving with EM to controls based on
observable characteristics would be difficult. Instead of applying Propensity Score Matching
Table 5 Regression models: Effects of EM, dep. var.: completed upper secondary education post-release
Completed upper secondary education
3 months
after
6 months
after
1 year
after
1.5 year
after
2 years
after
2.5 years
after
3 years
after
Models A: OLS-
estimates
Served with EM (no
covariates)
0.027
(0.026)
0.062*
(0.029)
0.108***
(0.032)
0.179***
(0.034)
0.216***
(0.035)
0.219***
(0.034)
0.231***
(0.034)
Served with EM (with
covariates)
-0.012
(0.023)
0.014
(0.025)
0.045
(0.028)
0.102***
(0.029)
0.142***
(0.029)
0.144***
(0.030)
0.161***
(0.031)
Models B: Intent-to-treat-estimates
Offered to serve with
EM (no covariates)
-0.007
(0.023)
0.014
(0.025)
0.029
(0.028)
0.070*
(0.030)
0.097**
(0.031)
0.096**
(0.031)
0.110***
(0.031)
Offered to serve with
EM (with covariates)
-0.020
(0.021)
0.002
(0.022)
0.015
(0.024)
0.056*
(0.026)
0.092***
(0.027)
0.096***
(0.028)
0.113***
(0.028)
Models C: 2SLS-estimates
Served with EM (no
covariates)
-0.011
(0.036)
0.022
(0.040)
0.046
(0.044)
0.112*
(0.047)
0.155**
(0.048)
0.152**
(0.049)
0.176***
(0.049)
Served with EM (with
covariates)
-0.031
(0.032)
0.003
(0.034)
0.024
(0.038)
0.089*
(0.040)
0.145***
(0.041)
0.151***
(0.043)
0.178***
(0.044)
Observations 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013 1013
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
Robust standard errors in parentheses and * p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
Covariates: gender, ethnicity, living at home, age at conviction, type of offense, sentence length, number of
prior convictions, prior prison convictions, primary schooling and upper secondary education at conviction
(type and years enrolled)
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to estimate the treatment effects of serving with EM, I use the setup to refine the initial
selection of the treatment and control groups, and subsequently, estimate 2SLS models to
take selection to the EM-program into account. Based on the results from a propensity score
model, I restrict the sample (n = 1013) to cases with common support (n = 1006) and then
estimate 2SLS-models with this sub-sample. The results from this sensitivity analysis are
very similar to the reported findings (see Table 7 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). This is, however, not
surprising, as the calculation of the propensity score only leads to the exclusion of 7
observations from the control group. These findings support the claim that the construction
of the control group based on the formal criterion to serve with EM provides a reliable match
to the treatment group on observable characteristics. Moreover, the results support that the
EM-reform constitutes a natural experiment creating variation in the offered sanction type to
young offenders with a prison sentence exogenous to individual characteristics.
Second, some offenders in the treatment group broke the terms of the EM-program and
ended up serving the rest of their sentence in prison. This group experienced both electronic
monitoring and prison, and to make sure that these ‘double treated’ offenders do not affect the
results, I estimate the 2SLS-models without these 29 individuals. The results are again very
similar to the reported findings (see Table 8 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Third, if offenders serving in
prison cannot continue their educational program during incarceration, this may delay their
completion of upper secondary education. To test whether the findings could be influenced by
the confinement time of the control group, I have estimated the 2SLS-models supplying three
extra months to complete upper secondary education to the control group. Even with the
extended follow-up periods for the control group, the significant differences between
offenders serving in prison and offenders serving with EM still exist and the effect sizes are
very similar to the reported finding (see Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
Finally, recent discussions regarding the evaluation of sanctions have highlighted the
importance of investigating heterogeneous treatment effects, as interventions may have varying
effects across different groups of offenders (Mears et al. 2015). In this study, the sample size
was, however, too small (resulting in large standard errors) to analyze heterogeneous effects
with separate models for different subpopulations (e.g., divided by age, education length, prison
conditions or prior prison history). In future studies, this type of analysis will be relevant in order
to assess, for example, which groups of offenders benefit the most from serving with EM.
Conclusion and Discussion
The results of the empirical analyses reveal significant differences between offenders
serving with electronic monitoring and offenders serving in prison when we look at their
educational outcomes after release. For offenders between 18 and 25 who fulfill the formal
requirements to serve with EM, participation in the EM-program increases the probability
of completing upper secondary education by 11 % points after 1.5 years and by 18 %
points 3 years after release, compared to imprisonment. The analyses show longer-term
effects of electronic monitoring on educational outcomes, when given to young offenders
with short-term prison sanctions who are enrolled in education at the time of conviction.
Looking at the time trend, the findings suggest that the EM-program has a short-term
retention effect: keeping young offenders in the educational system, which then, in the
longer run, turns into higher completion rates of upper secondary education. If the effects of
the EM-program on young offenders’ educational outcomes had been limited to the first time
periods, this could suggest that incarceration (directly or indirectly) forced young offenders to
drop out of educational programs. The empirical analyses do not detect short-term inca-
pacitation effects; instead, the difference between the two groups gradually increases during
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the 3 year follow-up period. These longer-term effects of the EM-program on the young
offenders’ subsequent educational outcomes suggest that sanctioning with electronic mon-
itoring can have rehabilitative effects, compared with imprisonment, in the longer run.
In regards to the interpretation of the results, some considerations in relation to the content
of the Danish EM-program are important to discuss. The EM-program evaluated in this study
consists of several elements besides house arrest under electronic surveillance, and it is not
possible in the analyses to differentiate between these components. Prior qualitative research
has pointed to diverted effects of the EM-program, as the fixed time schedule and the
requirements to attend school help the offenders to structure their everyday lives (Jørgensen
2011). This is an example of one element in the program that is likely to enhance young
offenders’ chances of finishing their educational programs. Another element is the require-
ment of sobriety and no drug use during the EM-program, which is controlled by unan-
nounced visits from the DPPS. Drug testing has previously shown effects on offenders’
likelihood of school dropout post-release (Kilmer 2008). This element is a common trait of
both imprisonment and the EM-program, but drug use is (similar to many other countries)
common among prisoners in Danish prisons. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out that some
of the treatment effect can be attributed to the alcohol and drug control in the EM-program. As
mentioned above, the empirical analyses of the Danish EM-program do not distinguish
between the separate program elements and how much they each contribute to the positive
effects on educational outcomes. But, the empirical analyses show effects long after the end of
the program (maximum duration of 92 days), which suggests that the combination of house
arrest with electronic surveillance and the other elements in Danish EM-program affect the
participants in the longer run. If we return to the theoretical perspective on the effects of
sanctions, the empirical results do not support the deterrence perspective, which points to
lower educational outcomes for offenders serving with EM, when compared to offenders
serving in prison. The positive effects of the EM-program could, from the social learning and
peer theory perspective, be explained by program participants having more contact with pro-
social peers (family and classmates) and less interaction with criminal peers.
The study is based on a natural experiment applying IV-estimations in order to take self-
selection and non-random allocation of permissions for the EM-program into account. The IV-
regression models identify the average treatment effects to the treated (ATET), which means that
the estimated effects apply to young offenders (18–25 years old) with short-term prison sen-
tences, enrolled in education at the time of conviction and participating in the EM-program. The
treatment effects of the EM-program can potentially be extended to a larger group of offenders,
as the compliance rate in the Danish program was only 63 %, and prior studies show that around
30 % of offenders offered the chance to serve with electronic monitoring do not apply to the EM-
program (Jørgensen 2011). This means that the positive effects of the EM-program on educa-
tional outcomes can potentially be furthered by increasing the application rate to the program.
In times with large prison populations and discussions regarding downsizing, it is
important to recognize that alternative sanctions can have positive influences on young
offenders’ future outcomes, both in terms of recidivism (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013;
Jørgensen 2011; Marie 2015) and in regards to labor market participation (Andersen and
Andersen 2014) and educational outcomes. These findings are important in order to
evaluate the returns of introducing noncustodial sanctions and to inform future policy
decisions and discussion on electronic monitoring. It will, however, be important to do
further qualitative and quantitative research to achieve a deeper understanding of the
mechanisms behind these results: how the different program elements affect offenders’
future outcomes, how sanction types influence educational trajectories and how different
outcomes like crime, education and labor market participation are interrelated.
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Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9.
Table 6 First stage OLS regression model, dependent variable: served with EM (treatment delivered),
including results for covariates
Served with EM
Convicted after EM-Reform 2006 0.633*** (0.023)
Demography
Male offender (ref.) – –
Female offender -0.149* (0.072)
Native Dane and western immigrant (ref.) – –
Non-western immigrant -0.087** (0.028)
Living at home Jan. 1st in year of conviction -0.000 (0.023)
Conviction
Age 18 at conviction -0.010 (0.035)
Age 19 at conviction 0.005 (0.030)
Age 20 at conviction (ref.) – –
Age 21 at conviction 0.051 (0.033)
Age 22 at conviction -0.001 (0.038)
Age 23 at conviction -0.031 (0.043)
Age 24 at conviction 0.020 (0.048)
Convicted for violence (ref.) – –
Convicted for property crime -0.054 (0.030)
Convicted for traffic offense -0.088 (0.072)
Convicted for drug or weapon related offense 0.033 (0.051)
Other criminal offenses -0.049 (0.044)
Prison sentence 1–15 days 0.038 (0.036)
Prison sentence 16–30 days 0.032 (0.028)
Prison sentence 31–45 days 0.074* (0.032)
Prison sentence 46–60 days (ref.) – –
Prison sentence 61–92 days 0.020 (0.032)
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Table 6 continued
Served with EM
Crime history
No prior convictions 0.008 (0.032)
1 prior conviction (ref.) – –
2 prior convictions 0.033 (0.031)
3–5 prior convictions -0.012 (0.031)
More than 5 prior convictions -0.042 (0.039)
No prior prison convictions 0.031 (0.030)
Education
Finished 8th grade -0.070 (0.044)
Finished 9th grade -0.048* (0.021)
Finished 10th grade (ref.) – –
No record finished primary school -0.019 (0.053)
General education (1st–3rd year) 0.040 (0.039)
Vocational education 1st year (ref.) – –
Vocational education 2nd year 0.033 (0.028)
Vocational education 3rd year 0.070* (0.029)
Vocational education 4th year 0.093** (0.031)
Constant -0.039 (0.049)
Observations 1013
R2 (adjusted) 0.505
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
Robust standard errors in parentheses and * p\ 0.05, ** p\ 0.01, *** p\ 0.001
Table 7 2SLS regression models: sensitivity analyses (only observations with common support)
3 months
after
6 months
after
1 year
after
1.5 year
after
2 years
after
2.5 years
after
3 years
after
Dep.var: completed Upp. Sec. Educ.
Served with EM (no covariates) -0.009 0.024 0.047 0.112* 0.157** 0.156** 0.179***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Served with EM (with
covariates)
-0.030 0.004 0.025 0.089* 0.146*** 0.152*** 0.179***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044)
First stage: served with EM
Convicted after the EM-Reform
(no covariates)
0.628*** 0.628*** 0.628*** 0.628*** 0.628*** 0.628*** 0.628***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Convicted after the EM-Reform
(with covariates)
0.633*** 0.633*** 0.633*** 0.633*** 0.633*** 0.633*** 0.633***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006
Data source: Administrative register data from Statistics Denmark and the Department of Prison and
Probation Service for Danish offenders (age 18–25) sentenced short-term prison sentences in 2003–2009
Robust standard errors in parentheses and * p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01; *** p\ 0.001
Covariates: gender, ethnicity, living at home, age at conviction, type of offense, sentence length, number of
prior convictions, prior prison convictions, primary schooling and upper secondary education at conviction
(type and years enrolled)
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